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Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez: Tightening the Noose on
Patients' Rights
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,1 the Supreme Court struck
down a law prohibiting federally-funded legal aid lawyers from
challenging existing welfare law when representing indigent clients.2
On its face, Velazquez stands for the premise that confidential
relationships implicate First Amendment interests and should not be
unduly infringed upon by the government, even when the government
is funding that relationship with a subsidy.' To reach this result,
however, the Court was required to either distinguish or overrule its
decade-old decision4 in Rust v. Sullivan.5 In Rust, the Court upheld a
law prohibiting federally-funded doctors from advising indigent
patients about abortion when discussing family planning.6 The Court
chose to distinguish the Rust decision on the ground that the doctor-
patient speech in Rust constituted government speech whereas the
lawyer-client speech in Velazquez constituted private speech.7
This Recent Development will argue that no significant
distinction exists between the type of speech involved in Rust and the
type of speech involved in Velazquez; namely, doctor-to-patient
speech is the same type of speech as lawyer-to-client speech. Thus,
according to the parameters outlined in Velazquez and other federal
cases,8 both should be considered private, not government, speech.
By choosing to distinguish Rust, rather than overrule it or limit it to
circumstances involving abortion, the Court's reasoning undermines
the strength of the Velazquez holding and invites future limitations on
the scope of patients' rights.
This Recent Development will proceed by discussing the Rust
and Velazquez decisions and the general status of First Amendment
law regarding subsidies. Next, this Recent Development will argue
that the reasoning used to distinguish the Velazquez decision from the
1. 531 U.S. 533, cert. denied, 532 U.S. 903 (2001). Justice Kennedy delivered the
opinion of the Court joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
2. Id. at 537.
3. See id. at 547-48.
4. Id. at 541-42.
5. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
6. Id. at 193.
7. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 540-43. For a discussion of the difference between
government and private speech, see infra notes 40-59 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 34-66 and accompanying text.
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Rust decision is erroneous primarily because physicians, like
attorneys, have a professional obligation to represent the best
interests of those they serve. Finally, this Recent Development will
consider some of the interests served by protecting the privileged
nature of doctor-patient discourse and the historical preference in
both statutory and common law favoring patients' rights to unbiased
medical treatment.
Both Rust and Velazquez involved government subsidies of
public services.9 Velazquez involved the Legal Services Corporation
Act ("LSC Act" or "Act"), 10 which Congress enacted in 1974 "for the
purpose of providing financial support for legal assistance in
noncriminal proceedings or matters to persons financially unable to
afford legal assistance."" The LSC Act established the nonprofit
Legal Services Corporation ("LSC") to disperse funds allocated
under the Act to qualifying local grantee organizations. 12  The
grantees are independent non-profit organizations, unaffiliated with
the federal government. 3 Often funded by both private and public
sources, these organizations employ lawyers for the purpose of
offering free legal assistance to indigent clients in their communities.'
4
From the Act's inception, restrictions were placed on the use of
LSC funds. 5  Initially, no restrictions were placed on the
representation of clients seeking legal redress for denial of welfare
benefits. 6 In 1996, during a time of intense debate regarding the
value of welfare to American society, 7 Congress amended the LSC
9. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 536; Rust, 500 U.S. at 178.
10. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2000)).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a) (2000); Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 536.
12. See § 2996b(a).
13. See id.
14. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 536. Under the Act, a client must qualify as an "eligible
client," which is defined as a "person financially unable to afford legal assistance."
§ 2996a(3).
15. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 537. For example, the Act prohibits the use of program
funds "in most criminal proceedings and in litigation involving nontherapeutic abortions,
secondary school desegregation, military desertion, or violations of the Selective Service
statute." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996f(b)(8)-(10) (1994 and Supp. III)).
16. Id. at 538.
17. See 142 CONG. REC. H1808-04 (1996) (debating the merits of House Bill 3019, the
bill containing the restrictions at issue). The Representative from Illinois, Mr. Porter,
contributed to the debate over the value of welfare and the merits of House Bill 3019,
which cuts money from some programs and leaves money for others, when he stated:
Why would we want to pour more money into a failed program? It is time to
reinvent the program and make it work. It is time to do that with all the
spending for our Government, to make Government work better for people. Let
me tell you, there are many, many programs that have failed. Title I is one.
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Act to prohibit the subsidizing of any representation that "involve[d]
an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing [welfare] law
.... "18 While LSC-funded lawyers could challenge an agency's
factual determinations regarding welfare benefits or the agency's
legal interpretations of welfare laws, they could not challenge the
constitutionality or overall statutory validity of welfare laws. 9
Several LSC-funded lawyers and their clients, among others,
challenged the newly-enacted restrictions as impermissible in
violation of the First Amendment." The Plaintiffs argued that the
subsidy was unconstitutional because it discriminated based on
viewpoint.2 The Court agreed.2 The Court distinguished Rust, the
biggest hurdle to striking down the government restriction, by stating
that the counseling activities of the doctors in Rust "amounted to
governmental speech."23  While both the restrictions in Rust and
Velazquez were viewpoint-based, generally viewpoint-based
restrictions are permissible only when government speech is
involved.24
In Rust, the Court considered Title X of the Public Health
Service Act ("Title X"),25 which authorized expenditures for the
purpose of " 'assist[ing] in the establishment and operation of
voluntary family planning projects which shall offer a broad range of
acceptable and effective family planning methods and services.' "26
Similar to the administrative scheme authorized under the LSC Act,
the Secretary of Health and Human Services was authorized under
Title X " 'to make grants to and enter into contracts with public or
nonprofit private entities' " willing to implement the programs
outlined in Title X.27 The principal regulation on the subsidy in
Welfare is another. It is time we reinvent them and make them work better for
people.
Id. at H1841.
18. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 538. "[G]rantees could not accept representation designed
to change welfare laws, much less argue against the constitutionality or statutory validity
of those laws. Even in cases where constitutional or statutory challenges became apparent
after representation was well under way, LSC advised that its attorneys must withdraw."
Id. at 539. These restrictions also prohibited lobbying and rulemaking by LSC-funded
organizations. Id. at 538.
19. Id. at 538-39.
20. Id. at 537.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 540-41.
24. Id. at 541.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 300-300a-6 (2000).
26. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178 (1991) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (1988)).
27. Id. at 178 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (1988)).
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question in Rust was that no monies could be used to discuss abortion
as a feasible alternative when referring pregnant women for care.28
The subsidy grantees and their doctors sued on behalf of
themselves and their patients, arguing that the restriction on abortion
counseling violated the First and Fifth Amendment rights of their
patients and the First Amendment rights of the health care
providers. 29  The Court stated that although subsidized speech is
subject to First Amendment protection, the government is not
obligated to subsidize the exercise of fundamental rights.3  Rather,
the government has the right to selectively fund a program
encouraging the exercise of certain speech rights without subsidizing
analogous counterpart speech rights at the same time.3' The Court
held that exercising this right does not impermissibly discriminate
based on viewpoint unless the subsidy is found to "discriminate
invidiously ... in such a way as to 'aim at the suppression of
dangerous ideas.' "32 In Rust, the Court did not find any such
invidious discrimination; thus, the restriction was upheld.33
The Court found the circumstances in Velazquez distinguishable
from those in Rust. It categorized the counseling activities of the
lawyers in Velazquez as private speech, rather than government
speech.34 To support this speech allocation, the Court cited two
characteristics of the speech.35 First, lawyers have a professional
28. Id. at 179-80. Pregnancy testing was one of the services provided under the
subsidy. Whenever a patient tested positive for pregnancy, the doctors were required to
refer the patient for prenatal care and adoption services. If a patient asked directly about
abortion as an option, the doctor or counselor was permitted to state that "the project
does not consider abortion an appropriate method of family planning and therefore does
not counsel or refer for abortion." Id. at 180.
29. Id. at 181. The First Amendment argument was based on impermissible viewpoint
discrimination. Id. at 192. The Fifth Amendment argument was based on placing undue
restrictions on a woman's fundamental right to obtain an abortion. Id. at 201.
30. Id. at 192-93.
31. Id. In other words, the government may engage in viewpoint discrimination when
it sets criteria for entities who are eligible to receive government subsidies. "[A]
legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe
the right." Id. at 193 (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549
(1983)).
32. Id. at 192-93 (quoting Regan, 461 U.S. at 548). Thus, a government speech right
was created; however, the Court in Rust did not specifically characterize its holding in this
light. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541, cert. denied, 532 U.S. 903
(2001).
33. Rust, 500 U.S. at 192-99.
34. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542.
35. Id.
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obligation to act in the best interests of their clients.36 Second,
lawyers must advocate their clients' positions in a court of law.37 In
essence, the Court reasoned that when subsidized grantee speech
functions to represent the interests of others, the speech is private.38
Yet, as this Recent Development will demonstrate, the subsidized
grantee speech in Rust also functioned to represent the interests of
others.39  Given that both lawyer-client speech and doctor-patient
speech serve functions beyond the immediate interests of the speaker,
it becomes apparent that the premise on which the Court bases its
distinction between the speech in Velazquez and the speech in Rust is
unsound.
Viewpoint-based restrictions on speech are disfavored in First
Amendment law; private speech, however, is offered more
constitutional protection than government speech."n Accordingly,
viewpoint-based restrictions on private speech are subjected to
heightened scrutiny, whereas viewpoint-based restrictions on
government speech are not.4" In Velazquez, the Court found that the
restrictions on the private speech of the lawyers distorted an "existing
medium of expression."42 An existing medium of expression is a well-
known and delineated area of public life that has been "traditionally
open to the public for expressive activity. 4 3  Under heightened
scrutiny, the distortion of an existing medium of expression is
unconstitutional. 4 In this case, the Court held that when Congress
prohibited the funding of suits challenging the validity of certain laws
with its subsidy, it deprived the judiciary of its power to review the
36. Id. (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1981), which held that a
public defender does not act "under color of state law" because he "works under canons
of professional responsibility that mandate his exercise of independent judgment on behalf
of the client" and because there is an "assumption that counsel will be free of state
control").
37. Id.
38. See id. at 543.
39. See infra notes 75-93 and accompanying text.
40. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-29
(1995).
41. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543.
42. Id.
43. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 497
U.S. 720, 726 (1990)). The Rust Court referred to this concept as a "traditional sphere of
free expression," citing to examples such as speech on a university campus and, arguably,
the speech between doctors and patients. Id. In Velazquez, the existing medium of
expression was the legal system with its traditional roles of lawyer as advocate and the
judiciary as the interpreter of laws. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543.
44. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543-46.
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constitutionality and validity of these laws.45 Such a deprivation, the
Court found, "threatens severe impairment of the judicial function.
46
As such, the Court held that the restrictions on private speech in
Velazquez functioned to distort an existing medium of expression and
such distortion violates the First Amendment.47
The introduction of minimal review under the First Amendment
arose specifically in relation to government restrictions on subsidized
speech. Generally, government regulations that restrict speech
because of the viewpoint expressed are presumed to violate the First
Amendment, 48  but an exception is found in cases involving
government subsidies.49 Viewpoint-based discrimination in subsidies
were held not to implicate heightened First Amendment scrutiny
because the government has a special right to discriminate based on
viewpoint when it is speaking.50 Thus, when the government uses a
subsidy to speak for itself or to subsidize private speakers to transmit
its message, the subsidized speech is characterized as government
speech and restrictions on such speech are subject only to minimal
review.5"
A distinction between government and private speech in relation
to government restrictions on subsidized speech was first made in
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia.52 In
Rosenberger, the Court struck down a content-based restriction on
university student activity funds that were designated to encourage a
broad range of extracurricular student activities.53 The Court held
45. Id. at 547.
46. Id. at 546.
47. Id. at 547-48.
48. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828
(1995); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-43 (1994); Police Dep't of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
49. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-93 (1991); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
474-76 (1977); see also Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998)
(discussing the government's ability to subsidize some artistic expressions over others so
long as the administration of subsidies is not aimed at eliminating certain expressions).
50. Rust, 500 U.S. at 192-93; Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540,
549 (1983).
51. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541-42.
52. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
53. Id. at 836-37. The university withheld funding for a student newspaper because
the paper "primarily promotes or manifests a belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate
reality." Id. at 822-23. The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion ...... U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First
Amendment is interpreted to prohibit any form of government coercion or preference
about any individual religious belief. See JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES,
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL 423 (2d ed. 2000).
1318 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
that when the government uses 'a subsidy to create a limited public
forum,54 it is no longer acting as a speaker, but rather as a regulator.55
When the government acts as a regulator, the subsidized speech is
characterized as private and subject once again to heightened
scrutiny.56 When the university in Rosenberger created a limited
public forum by funding a program encouraging a broad range of
student views,57 the Court held that the public university was not
permitted to discriminate against a religious student periodical based
on its viewpoint.58 Thus, a subsidy with viewpoint-based regulations
was struck down because it was regulating private speech rather than
government speech. 9
Rust never referred to a "government speech" doctrine to justify
its ruling; it was only in later cases that the Court characterized the
medical counseling by the doctors in Rust as government speech.60
54. A limited public forum, for the purposes of First Amendment law, exists
whenever public property has been designated by the government as open to expressive
speech activity. BARRON & DIENES, supra note 53, at 208-09. The only restriction is that
speech may not be inconsistent with the normal functioning of the public property. Id.
Thus, in Rosenberger, the limited public forum is the university campus, which the
government has designated as open to expressive speech activity by the university's
students. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830-34; see also Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-93 (1993) (designating a school district's provision of
school facilities for use by private groups for meetings as a limited public forum).
55. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834-35. The government acts as a speaker whenever
its subsidy is seen as a form of government speech. BARRON & DIENES, supra note 53, at
348-49. In other words, the government is seen as an actual participant in the
"marketplace of ideas." Id. Thus, the government was acting as a speaker when Congress
chose, in the exercise of its spending power, to make a statement by subsidizing the
lobbying activity of veterans organizations but not to subsidize the lobbying activity of
other charitable organizations. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 549-51. In contrast, the
government acts as a regulator whenever its subsidy controls or censors private
expression. BARRON & DIENES, supra note 53, at 348-49. Thus, the government was
acting as a regulator when it controlled the type of messages students groups could convey
with student activity funds.
56. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542-43; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834-35.
57. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-32.
58. Id. at 837.
59. Id.
60. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542 ("The Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on
the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to
governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have
explained Rust on this understanding."). The Court in Velazquez cites Board of Regents
of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000), which simply
cites Rust when stating that the government has a general right to advocate and defend its
own policies through the use subsidies, Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542, and cites Rosenberger,
where the Court stated that the government used private speakers to transmit a specific
message in Rust, Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542. But see
Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If the private doctors' confidential
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Subsequently, several federal appellate courts developed criteria to
determine whether particular subsidized speech is government or
private.6 Much of the analysis focuses on who is the literal speaker
and whether the government or the private entity bears the ultimate
responsibility for the content of the speech.6' A recent example is the
Fourth Circuit's determination that the mottos and decorations on
state-owned license plates are private speech.63 The primary reasons
the Fourth Circuit gave for making this determination were the
purpose of the special plate program (to produce revenue by allowing
for private expression of various views), the lack of actual editorial
control exercised by the State, and the "connection of any message on
the plate to the driver or owner of the vehicle." 6 In contrast, the
Eighth Circuit found that the underwriting acknowledgments
announced on a public radio station constituted government speech.65
In so holding, the Eighth Circuit cited the following factors: the
central purpose of the underwriting program was not to promote the
views of its donors; the public radio station exercised editorial control
over the content of underwriting acknowledgments; the literal
speaker was a public radio station employee; and the ultimate
responsibility for the contents of the broadcast rested with the public
advice to their patients at issue in Rust constituted 'government speech,' it is hard to
imagine what subsidized speech would not be government speech.").
61. See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Va. Dep't of Motor
Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618-21 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that special logos and decorations
on state-owned license plates is private speech); Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257
F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a sign posted by the government listing the
private sponsors of a holiday display is government speech); Knights of the Ku Klux Klan
v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1094 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
underwriting acknowledgements announced on a public radio station constituted
government speech).
62. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 621. A four-factor test emerged in
several of the federal circuit courts to help determine whether speech qualifies as
government speech or private speech. The test examines:
(1) the central "purpose" of the program in which the speech in question occurs;
(2) degree of "editorial control" exercised by the government or private entities
over the content of the speech; (3) the identity of the "literal speaker;" and (4)
whether the government or the private entity bears the "ultimate responsibility"
for the content of the speech.
Id. at 618 (utilizing and citing use of the test in Wells, 257 F.3d at 1141 and Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan, 203 F.3d at 1093-94). The Ninth Circuit used similar reasoning in Downs v.
Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 2000).
63. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 621.
64. Id.
65. See Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 203 F.3d at 1093 (permitting the public radio
station to decline an underwriting contribution from the Ku Klux Klan to avoid
announcing the organization as an underwriter on the air).
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radio station.66 As these cases demonstrate, the criteria used by these
federal circuits focus heavily on the actual speaker and the connection
listeners make between the speaker's message and the speaker's
identity.
When considering the criteria established by the federal circuit
courts, it is reasonable to conclude that lawyer-client speech should
be classified as private due to the connection of the lawyer's speech to
the individual lawyer and her client rather than to the government.
This same connection is also reasonably made of the physician's
speech to the individual physician and his patient, rather than the
government. This similarity arises because the physician and the
lawyer share nearly identical professional obligations to their patients
and clients, respectively. 67 Because the characteristics of doctor-to-
patient speech are essentially the same as the characteristics of
lawyer-to-client speech, it does not make sense to distinguish the type
of speech in Rust from the type of speech in Velazquez. Thus, the
Velazquez Court erred when it failed to either overrule Rust or
expressly limit it to abortion cases.
As acknowledged by the Velazquez Court, a lawyer must act
with the utmost competence, diligence, and loyalty toward her client
at all times. 68 Because the attorney-client relationship is fiduciary in
nature,69 the attorney has a professional obligation to act in the
client's best interests.70 Lawyers are not permitted to allow others
who pay or employ them to interfere with their professional judgment
when rendering legal services.1 If a lawyer should breach any of
these duties, she can be held liable civilly for professional
malpractice72 and professionally for violation of mandatory ethics
regulations.73 The Court stated that the lawyer's role as a fiduciary
and advocate is the key distinguishing factor between the government
speech in Rust and the private speech in the instant case.74
66. Id. at 1093-94.
67. See infra notes 68-93 and accompanying text.
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 1.3, 1.7 (2001). By 1999, over eighty
percent of the states had adopted the Model Rules, subject only to various state-specific
amendments. RONALD D. ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICs: THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 1-1.5.4 (2002-2003).
69. ROTUNDA, supra note 68, § 3-1.1.
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (2000).
71. MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f) (2001).
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, §§ 48-50.
73. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (2001) (describing the self-regulation
of lawyers, including self-imposed disciplinary rules).
74. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542-43, cert. denied, 532 U.S. 903
(2001).
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Similarly, physicians also must meet the standards of a fiduciary
and advocate to satisfy the obligations prescribed by their
profession.75 The American Medical Association has stated that the
"physician has an ethical obligation to help the patient make choices
from among the therapeutic alternatives consistent with good medical
practice."76 The Principles of Medical Ethics state that "[a] physician
shall respect the law and also recognize a responsibility to seek
changes in those requirements which are contrary to the best interests
of the patient."77  In addition, "[u]nder no circumstances may
physicians place their own financial interests above the welfare of
their patients."" Contemporary medical ethics literature assumes
that a physician is "the advocate and champion of his patient,
upholding the patient's interest above all others."79 The physician's
role historically is described as "an agent and trustee for the patient,"
acting at all times as a fiduciary or representative.8" Thus, these
professional obligations require physicians to serve as both a fiduciary
and an advocate when treating patients.
In many states, fiduciary standards are strictly enforced by
medical boards that are authorized to suspend or revoke physician
licenses for violating the Principles of Medical Ethics." In 2002, the
75. See Ken Marcus Gatter, Protecting Patient-Doctor Discourse: Informed Consent
and Deliberative Autonomy, 78 OR. L. REV. 941, 955-57 (1999) (arguing that physicians
occupy a fiduciary role in their relation to patients); Halle Fine Terrion, Note, Informed
Choice: Physicians' Duty to Disclose Nonreadily Available Alternatives, 43 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 491, 509-10 (1993) (chronicling the fiduciary obligations that physicians owe to
their patients).
76. Am. Med. Ass'n, Current Opinions of Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs E-
8.08, http://www.ama-assn.org (last visited Jan. 19, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) [hereinafter Am. Med. Ass'n, Current Opinions]. Regarding abortion, the
American Medical Association has stated the following: "The Principles of Medical
Ethics of the AMA do not prohibit a physician from performing an abortion in accordance
with good medical practice and under circumstances that do not violate the law." AM.
MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, OPINIONS ON SOCIAL POLICY § 2.01 Abortion
at 3 (2000-2001) [hereinafter AM. MED. ASs'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS].
77. AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 76, at xxv.
78. Am. Med. Ass'n, Current Opinions, supra note 76, at E-8.03.
79. Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties
and Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 246 (1995)
(quoting the American College of Physicians).
80. Id. at 247.
81. See, e.g., Arlen v. Ohio, 399 N.E.2d 1251, 1252-54 (Ohio 1980) (recognizing the
licensing board's prerogative to decide whether a standard of practice has been met); Kirk
v. Jefferson County Med. Soc'y, 577 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (affirming the
medical society's expulsion of a physician for breach of ethical principles). In North
Carolina, the Medical Board is statutorily authorized to "deny, annul, suspend, or revoke"
a medical license for "[u]nprofessional conduct, including but not limited to, departure
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North Carolina Medical Board reprimanded a doctor and forbade
him from recommending to his patients vitamins and supplements
that he had a financial interest in promoting. 2 The board found that
such a conflict of interest breached the doctor's professional
obligation to act solely for the benefit of the patient.83
Legally, the core assumption is that physicians occupy a fiduciary
role in relation to their patients.8 4 Many states expressly recognize
physicians as fiduciaries," and all states recognize a physician's
fiduciary duty in the area of informed consent.86 Under tort law,
compliance with the informed consent doctrine is required in order
for doctors to meet legal standards of reasonable behavior.87 Thus,
from, or the failure to conform to, the standards of acceptable and prevailing medical
practice, or the ethics of the medical profession." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14(a)(6) (2001).
82. N.C. Med. Bd., Board Orders/Consent Orders/Other Board Actions, at 3 (Jan.-
Feb. 2002), at http://www.ncmedboard.org/ba30.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). In its position statements regarding various topics relating to medical ethics, the
North Carolina Medical Board describes the physician-patient relationship as follows:
The Board believes the interests and health of the people of North Carolina are
best served when the physician-patient relationship, founded on patient trust, is
considered sacred, and when the elements crucial to that relationship and to that
trust--communication, patient primacy, confidentiality, competence, patient
autonomy, compassion, selflessness, and appropriate care-are foremost in the
hearts, minds, and actions of the physicians licensed by the Board.
N.C. Med. Bd., The Physician-Patient Relationship, http://www.ncmedboard.org/phypat.
htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
83. N.C. Med. Bd., Board Orders/Consent Orders/Other Board Actions, supra note 82,
at 3.
84. EDWARD P. RICHARDS, III & KATHARINE C. RATHBUN, MEDICAL CARE LAW
173 (1999).
85. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 994 (West 1995) (codifying the privileged physician-
patient relationship); Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 646, 325 S.E.2d 469, 482 (1985)
("The relationship of patient and physician is generally considered a fiduciary one,
imposing upon the physician the duty of good faith and fair dealing. This special
relationship envisions an expectation by both parties that the patient will rely upon the
judgment and expertise of the doctor.") (citations omitted).
86. All fifty states recognize some version of the informed consent doctrine. See
Ketchup v. Howard, 543 S.E.2d 371, 381-86 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (documenting the case
law in forty-nine states in the appendix to the majority opinion); see also Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting that it is a root premise in American
law that each person has the right to determine what is done with his or her body); Cobbs
v. Grant, 502 P.2d. 1, 7-8 (Cal. 1972) (discussing the informed consent doctrine);
Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 696 P.2d 527, 529-30 (Or. 1985) (discussing a
physician's duty of confidentiality); Lockett v. Goodill, 430 P.2d 589, 591 (Wash. 1967)
(discussing the fiduciary relationship between patients and physicians); Miller v. Kennedy,
522 P.2d 852, 860 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (discussing the informed consent doctrine).
87. See Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 465 A.2d 294, 298-99 (Conn. 1983); Keogan
v. Holy Family Hosp., 622 P.2d 1246, 1252 (Wash. 1980) (en banc). When treating a
patient, this doctrine generally requires doctors to give patients information regarding the
diagnosis, nature, and purpose of the treatment, the expected outcome and probability of
success of the treatment, the material risks, benefits, and consequences of the treatment,
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the informed consent doctrine places a legal obligation on doctors to
be thorough and candid when discussing medical options with their
patients. Given the strict fiduciary and legal duties that physicians
must maintain, the Court's distinction between a doctor's obligations
to her patients in Rust and a lawyer's obligations to his clients in
Velazquez is plainly erroneous.88
Finally, the Title X statute itself required its program physicians
to act in a fiduciary capacity. In Planned Parenthood Federation v.
Bowen,8 9 the court stated that "Congress designed Title X to combat
the problem of access to family planning services for women with low
incomes."9 Another court stated that the subsidy was specifically
targeted at the "poorest, most naive and ignorant women."91 The
doctors in Rust were given complete discretion to offer a broad range
of family planning and counseling services to these underprivileged
women; they were only restricted in their use of any services relating
to abortion.92 This legislative history implies that Congress intended
for health providers at these clinics to represent and promote the
interests of others-specifically the medical interests of "poor, naive,
and ignorant" women and their unborn children.93 Thus, the stated
goals of Congress required the Title X physicians to act in the
interests of the targeted group, low-income female patients, by giving
the reasonable alternatives to the treatment, and the effect of no treatment or procedure.
See Dorothy Duffy & Martha C. Romney, Medicine and Law: Recent Developments in
Peer Review and Informed Consent, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 331, 345 (1991); Nancy M.P.
King, Consent to Treatment, in HOSPITAL LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA 1, 6 (Anne M.
Dellinger ed., 1990). Some courts have held that a physician must inform patients of
alternatives, even if those alternatives are more hazardous or if they are outside the
physician's area of expertise. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 274-75
(1995). A doctor, however, does not have to disclose alternatives that are not considered
"legitimate treatment options." See id
88. Chiefly, the Court states that "[t]he advice from the attorney to the client and the
advocacy by the attorney to the courts cannot be classified as governmental speech even
under a generous understanding of the concept. In this vital respect this suit is
distinguishable from Rust." Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542-43, cert.
denied, 532 U.S. 903 (2001).
89. 680 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Colo. 1988).
90. Id. at 1469. The law's goal was to provide "comprehensive voluntary family
planning services" to women with incomes 150 percent below the poverty level. See
Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1499-1500 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing
H.R. Rep. No. 91-1472 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5068, 5075).
91. Sullivan, 913 F.2d at 1500.
92. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
93. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-1472 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5068, 5075
(stating, specifically, the needs of "low income mothers and families"). Justice Scalia
stated in his dissent that "[i]f the private doctors' confidential advice to their patients at
issue in Rust constituted 'government speech,' it is hard to imagine what subsidized speech
would not be government speech." Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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them medical advice and direction regarding each of their family
planning needs.
In sum, both professional and legal standards indicate that the
doctor-patient relationship is fiduciary in nature. Additionally,
Congress implicitly recognized the fiduciary nature of this
relationship when it set the goals for the Title X program in Rust.94 It
is thus irrational to distinguish the attorney-client speech in
Velazquez from the doctor-patient speech in Rust on the basis that
the attorney speech in Velazquez functions to represent the interests
of others.95 Like the lawyers in Velazquez, the physicians in Rust
were required to represent the best interests of those they serve.96
The specious nature of this distinction did not go unnoticed in the
Velazquez opinion. In his dissent, Justice Scalia characterized the
Court's distinction between the speech in Velazquez and the speech
in Rust as "so unpersuasive it hardly needs response."97  Indeed,
under the Court's stated reasoning in Velazquez, the doctor-patient
speech in Rust was private,98  and, therefore, the later
characterizations of the speech classification in Rust should have been
overruled by the Velazquez Court. Continuing to classify the speech
in Rust as governmental is simply inconsistent with the reasoning in
Velazquez.
The Court in Velazquez also stated that an attorney's role as an
advocate to the courts distinguishes the attorney's speech from the
doctor's speech in Rust.99 Citing the distortion of an existing medium
of expression, the Court held that a restriction on attorney arguments
before the judiciary threatened "severe impairment" of the judiciary's
function to ensure the constitutionality of existing law.100  This
argument is flawed in several respects. First, non-LSC lawyers are
unfettered in their right to make constitutional and statutory
challenges to existing welfare law.' Moreover, there is nothing that
94. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
95. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543.
96. See supra notes 68-93 and accompanying text.
97. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority's contention
that the subsidized speech in these cases is not government speech because the lawyers
have a professional obligation to represent the interests of their clients founders on the
reality that the doctors in Rust had a professional obligation to serve the interests of their
patients.").
98. See id. at 542 ("[Tjhe LSC Program was designed to facilitate private speech, not
to promote a governmental message.").
99. Id. at 545.
100. See id. at 545-46.
101. Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court has held that subsidies that are not
otherwise in violation of First Amendment interests may become impermissible if they
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mandates congressional subsidy of welfare litigation. °2 Finally,
because judicial decisions regarding issues that are not raised are not
binding, the opinions produced by LSC cases will not distort the
interpretation of welfare laws. 1 3 Thus, there was no indication that
an existing medium of expression actually was distorted.
In addition to the arguments listed above, the Rust Court
specifically rejected an "existing medium of expression" argument
levied by the petitioners in that case. 4 In Rust, the Court stated that
there are "traditional sphere[s] of free expression so fundamental to
the functioning of our society that the government's ability to control
speech within that sphere" is severely limited.05  While the doctor-
patient relationship could qualify as a traditional sphere of free
expression, that question was not at issue.0 6 Instead, Rust posited
that because the doctor's role was limited to pre-conception care, it
was not reasonable for the patients to expect comprehensive medical
advice regarding their options during pregnancy (post-conception).'
Accordingly, the subsidy restrictions did not "significantly impinge
upon the doctor-patient relationship" because the scope of the
doctor's advice was limited sufficiently.108
The Rust rationale that professional representation may be
limited to certain contexts is directly applicable to the lawyer's role in
Velazquez. Because ethical rules permit lawyers to limit the scope of
their representations, 109 the subsidy was permissible in that it simply
limited the scope of the lawyer's counsel. Therefore, the subsidy
restrictions did not significantly impinge upon the attorney-client
"effectively prohibit[] the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside the
scope of the federally funded program." Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197 (1991). Thus,
in FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), a subsidy that prohibited "all
editorializing" on public broadcast stations was in violation of the First Amendment
because of its sweeping scope, whereas a simple restriction on the funding of editorializing
with program funds would have been permissible. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197
(1991) (citing League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400).
102. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 548.
103. Id. at 557 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Any presumed statutory validity of welfare laws
involved in LSC cases remains "open for full determination in later cases" seeking to
challenge the law. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).





109. An attorney may limit the scope of representation of a client as long as the client
consents to the limited representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7
(2001).
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relationship because the lawyers were able to explain the limited
nature of their representations to the clients and the courts."'
Moreover, the Rust rationale that professionals may limit the
scope of their representation is even more compelling under the
Velazquez facts because the lawyers are permitted to explain to their
clients their views on the legality of welfare law."' The doctors in
Rust were not permitted to discuss their views regarding the option of
abortion with the patient"' or refer clients to other doctors offering
abortion services, even if the patient specifically asked for a
referral." 3 In contrast, the lawyers in Velazquez are able to refer
clients to attorneys who can represent them in non-covered matters."
4
Finally, the fact that attorneys act as advocates to the courts
whereas physicians generally do not occupy a similar third-party
advocacy role does not sufficiently distinguish the doctor speech in
Rust from the attorney speech in Velazquez. The Court's referral to
this type of advocacy role is directly related to the Court's premise
that lawyers must represent the interests of others and, as such, their
speech cannot be classified as governmental." 5 The fact that a
physician's functional duties generally do not require her to advocate
for her patients to a third party tribunal does not disparage this
underlying premise. Because physicians also have strict professional
and legal obligations to represent the interests of others, doctor-to-
patient speech, like lawyer-to-client speech, should reasonably be
classified as private. A distinction between physician speech and
lawyer speech based on a lawyer's role as advocate to the courts is,
thus, unfounded and illusory.
Ultimately, the Court fails to distinguish adequately the
attorney-client relationship in Velazquez from the doctor-patient
relationship in Rust. This failure undermines the privileged nature of
doctor-patient discourse by introducing an unfounded distinction
between the nature of attorney-client speech and the nature of
110. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 551, cert. denied, 532 U.S. 903
(2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112. Rust, 500 U.S. at 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
113. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
114. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 551 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 542-43. Notably, the professional obligations of doctors do not relieve
doctors of third-party advocacy functions if such a role is required for the general welfare
of their patients. The hallmark standard is that the doctor must always do that which is in
the best interests of his patients. See supra notes 75-93 and accompanying text.
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doctor-patient speech into First Amendment jurisprudence. 16 This
unfounded distinction, in turn, invites future limitations on the scope
of confidential doctor-patient speech, particularly because the status
of doctor-patient speech currently is evolving due to the Court's
decision in Velazquez. The Velazquez holding can be interpreted as
either confining the circumstances in Rust to cases involving abortion
or, at worst, relegating all subsidized doctor-patient speech to that of
government speech. Any classification that would permit reduced
scrutiny under the First Amendment, such as a government speech
classification, necessarily would reduce the amount of constitutional
protection afforded to the speech of doctors and patients.
Heightened protection of doctor-patient discourse is important
to the interests of patients' rights for several reasons. Justice
Blackmun, in his dissent in Rust, concluded that regulations on
doctor-patient speech tend to have the effect of "manipulating"
patients.'17  This effect arises because patients are particularly
vulnerable within the doctor-patient relationship due to an "essential
inequality of the parties with respect to knowledge" regarding
medical treatment." 8 This vulnerability is evidenced by the fact that
"patients often depend on doctors to help them make decisions.
Trust is an essential part of the relationship.""' 9 This special role of
trust has been acknowledged by the Court:
This idea of the physician as serving the whole person is a
source of the high value traditionally placed on the medical
relationship. Its value is surely as apparent here as in the
abortion cases, for just as the decision about abortion is not
directed to correcting some pathology, so the decision in
which a dying patient seeks help is not so limited. 2 °
Empirical data suggest that messages of state preference transmitted
by private doctors are particularly vulnerable to being garbled or
116. See Gatter, supra note 75, at 955-59 (arguing that fiduciary principles inform the
view of the doctor-patient relationship). Indeed, the Court in Rust did not disparage the
privileged nature of doctor-patient relationships. The Court recognized the possibility
that "traditional relationships such as that between doctor and patient [may] enjoy
protection under the First Amendment from Government regulation, even when
subsidized by the Government." Rust, 500 U.S. at 200. The Court, however, declined to
decide the issue. Id.
117. Rust, 500 U.S. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
118. Terrion, supra note 75, at 508 (citing Dale H. Cowan & Eva Bertsch, Innovative
Therapy: The Responsibility of Hospitals, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 219,225 (1984)).
119. Gatter, supra note 75, at 970.
120. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 779 (1997) (Souter J., dissenting). In
Glucksberg, the Court held that a Washington statute criminalizing assisted suicide did not
infringe on any constitutional due process liberty right. Id. at 705.
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misunderstood by patients.1 21  Researchers have concluded that
patients are much more likely to "give great weight to physicians'
expressions of state preferences, not because they are persuaded by
the messages, but merely because the messages are delivered by
physicians. 122 Thus, the inherent trust that patients have in
physicians can cause them to misunderstand messages of state
preference as messages of medical advice from the physician. This
misunderstanding, in turn, implicates the First Amendment interests
of both the physicians and the patients to communicate without
distortion.23
In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists124 and City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., the Court acknowledged that citizens have a
fundamental right to receive medical advice from their doctors that is
not unduly restricted by the State.'26 While subsequent cases held
that the doctor-patient discourse could be subject to reasonable
licensing and regulation by the State, 27 the Court continued to
recognize a citizen's interest in receiving "a physician's counsel and
care" without undue interference from the State. 28 For example, in
Pegram v. Herdrich,'29 the Court acknowledged that doctors have a
121. For example, in Rust, the message of state preference was the permitted referrals
for adoption and counseling, but not abortion, for unwanted children; thus, the state
preference was for childbirth over abortion. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. This message,
however, could have been easily garbled in a number of ways. First, the patient could be
mistaken to think that the message of state preference actually was the doctor's personal
or professional preference. Second, the patient could be mistaken to believe that abortion
was not a viable medical option for her.
122. Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse and
the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201, 229 (1994). The
groups that are the least likely to question doctor speech are non-white, poor, female, and
elderly. Id.
123. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 200 (stating that it could be argued that "traditional
relationships such as that between doctor and patient should enjoy protection under the
First Amendment from Government regulation, even when subsidized by the
Government").
124. 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
125. 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
126.. American Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. at 762-63; Akron Ctr.
For Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. at 427; see also Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 287-92 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing that patients have a
liberty interest in determining the course of their own medical treatment).
127. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844-69 (1992) (upholding a
statute that regulated abortion procedures).
128. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 778 (1997).
129. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
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legal duty to follow the "standards of reasonable and customary
medical practice," which includes acting in the best interests of the
patient. 13°  And yet, under Velazquez, the doctor's role remains
relegated to that of a governmental speaker-completely separated
from a patient's right to seek care that is in the patient's best interests,
not the state's interests.
131
Despite the privileged status accorded to the doctor-patient
relationship, the Court has expressly allowed state intrusion into
some types of doctor-patient speech, notably speech regarding
abortion. 32 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,133 the Court upheld a
statute requiring doctors, at the risk of losing their medical licenses,
to provide scripted information conveying a state preference for
childbirth over abortion to every patient seeking an abortion. 34  The
Court explained that doctor-patient speech can be subject to state
regulation.135 Such regulation may extend to requiring physicians to
communicate pre-scripted, viewpoint-based statements to patients
that are neither false nor misleading, but nevertheless are designed to
persuade the patients to choose childbirth over abortion.'36
These types of intrusions by the State generally are unique to
abortion and contraception 137 and should not operate to negate the
130. Id. at 235-36 (citing traditional standards of common law that require physicians
to act like fiduciaries as one reason why mixed eligibility and treatment decisions made by
a health maintenance organization, acting through its physicians, should not be considered
fiduciary acts within the meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act).
131. For example, in cases involving abortion, the state's preference against abortion
will be in conflict with the interests of patients who prefer to choose abortion. As abortion
prior to viability is still viewed as a fundamental constitutional right, see Casey, 505 U.S. at
869, and a medically reasonable treatment alternative, see supra note 76, it is clear that the
patient's best interests may conflict with the state's interests.
132. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
133. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
134. Id. at 881-84.
135. See id. at 878 ("[T]he State may take measures to ensure that the woman's choice
is informed, and measures designated to advance this interest will not be invalidated as
long as their purpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.").
136. See id. at 882.
137. See Paula E. Berg, Lost in a Doctrinal Wasteland: The Exceptionalism of Doctor-
Patient Speech Within the Rehnquist Court's First Amendment Jurisprudence, 8 HEALTH
MATRIX 153, 175-77 (1998) (arguing that the Supreme Court permitted the erosion of
doctor-patient speech rights in the abortion arena to accommodate the Court's views on
the practice of abortion, as evidenced by the Court's "highly protective" free speech
jurisprudence since the abortion decisions); see also Berg, supra note 122, at 219 (arguing
that the eroding of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence regarding doctor-patient
speech likely is motivated by the Court's views on the issue of abortion, not on any general
view that doctors and patients should be subject to less speech protection); Christina E.
Wells, Abortion Counseling as Vice Activity: The Free Speech Implications of Rust v.
Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1724, 1724 (1995) (arguing
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
sum of jurisprudence supporting a patient's right to unbiased medical
treatment. The abortion cases are not focused on eroding the special
relationship between doctors and their patients, but rather balancing
the state's interest in encouraging childbirth against a woman's
interest in bodily autonomy. 138 Thus, if the Court was not prepared to
overrule the speech classification in the Rust decision, it should have
expressly limited the classification to doctor-patient speech involving
abortion. This would have secured the privileged nature of doctor-
patient speech outside the context of abortion and would have been a
more accurate classification of the fiduciary and advocatory role
occupied by physicians.
Indeed, a strong societal preference favoring patients' rights to
unbiased medical treatment has been prevalent in this country since
the beginning of the twentieth century. 139 During the 1960s and 1970s,
the courts began recognizing a liberty interest in the attainment of
unbiased and fully-informed medical advice. 4°  In Moore v.
Preventative Medicine Medical Group, Inc.,41 a California court held
that a doctor had a duty to disclose to his patient the risk of not being
examined by a specialist. 42 In another California case, 43 the court
found that a physician's fiduciary duty to his patient prohibited the
physician from extracting excised cells from that patient for research
purposes without revealing "preexisting research and economic
interests in the cells."'" In El-Amin v. Yale-New Haven Hospital,145 a
woman who was not informed of the alternative of abortion when
faced with probable health impairments in her unborn child, sued and
settled with her doctor based on the premise that the doctor had a
legal obligation to inform her of all reasonable alternatives to
that the Supreme Court's hostility toward abortion motivated its departure from
traditional First Amendment analysis in Rust and Casey).
138. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-47 (stating that the State has a legitimate interest
in preserving fetal life and this interest must coexist with a woman's interest in bodily
autonomy).
139. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 87, at 265-66. Justice Cardozo, in Schloendorffv.
Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914), overruled on other grounds by
Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957), articulated the principle this way: "Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body .... Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93 (citations omitted).
140. See RICHARDS & RATHBUN, supra note 84, at 209-1.0.
141. 223 Cal. Rptr. 859 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
142. See id. at 863-64.
143. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
144. Id. at 480.
145. No. CV-900303287 (Conn. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 8, 1990).
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proposed treatments. 146  Most recently, in Conant v. McCaffrey,147 a
California district court granted a preliminary injunction against
federal drug enforcement officials, prohibiting them from threatening
or prosecuting physicians for advising patients about the medical use
of marijuana after enactment of Proposition 215, which permits the
medical use of marijuana in certain circumstances.1 48  The court
concluded that physicians have a First Amendment right to advocate
and encourage the medical use of marijuana, so long as their
advocacy does not incite unlawful action.
149
Such sentiments have also been found in federal legislation. The
Patient Self-Determination Act0 requires all hospitals, skilled
nursing facilities, home health agencies, and HMOs with Medicare or
Medicaid funding to provide patients with written information
pertaining to their rights under state law to make decisions
concerning their own medical care. 51 In 2002, by popular demand,
the Bipartisan Patient Protection Act (Patient's Bill of Rights)
52
proposed prohibition of interference by managed care organizations
with certain doctor-patient communications. 53  Thus, numerous
146. Id. But see Spencer v. Seikel, 742 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Okla. 1987) (holding that a
physician had no duty to inform a pregnant woman with a viable fetus of the possibility of
abortion).
147. 172 F.R.D. 681 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
148. Id. at 701. See generally Allison L. Bergstrom, Medical Use of Marijuana: A Look
at Federal and State Responses to California's Compassionate Use Act, 2 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 155,156 (1997) (discussing Conant).
149. Conant, 172 F.R.D. at 695.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (2000).
151. Id. § 1395cc(a)(1), (f)(1)(A).
152. H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. § 131 (2002). This bill ultimately failed to be enacted into
law.
153. Id. Section 131 concerns prohibiting interference with certain medical
communications:
(a) GENERAL RULE-The provisions of any contract or agreement, or the
operation of any contract or agreement, between a group health plan or health
insurance issuer in relation to health insurance coverage (including any
partnership, association, or other organization that enters into or administers
such a contract or agreement) and a health care provider (or group of health care
providers) shall not prohibit or otherwise restrict a health care professional from
advising such a participant, beneficiary, or enrollee who is a patient of the
professional about the health status of the individual or medical care or
treatment for the individual's condition or disease, regardless of whether benefits
for such care or treatment are provided under the plan or coverage, if the
professional is acting within the lawful scope of practice.
(b) NULLIFICATION-Any contract provision or agreement that restricts or
prohibits medical communications in violation of subsection (a) shall be null and
void.
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examples demonstrate the strong preference in both the statutory and
common law favoring a patient's right to unbiased medical treatment
and care.
In conclusion, beyond the area of abortion, the common and
statutory law overwhelmingly supports the existence of a special
relationship of trust between doctors and their patients, a relationship
that should not be tainted with conflicting interests. The Court in
Rust was not challenging the privileged nature of this relationship, but
it allowed the scope of the relationship to be limited in certain cases.
The Court in Velazquez blurred the distinction made in Rust when it
failed to either overrule the Rust speech classification later attributed
to the decision or expressly limit the speech classification to its special
circumstances. Unpersuasively deeming the doctor-patient speech in
Rust as governmental, while classifying the attorney-client speech in
Velazquez as private, is inconsistent with the reasoning used by the
Court in Velazquez. This characterization misrepresents the
privileged status of doctor-patient relationships and invites future
limitation of the scope of patients' rights.
JESSICA RUSSAK SHARPE
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